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FEDERALISM:   
RELIGION, EARLY AMERICA AND THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
 
DEAN EASTMAN:  Thank you, Judge Pryor.  We 
thought for a minute it was a Senate confirmation committee 
passing those leaflets out. 
 (Laughter.) 
DEAN EASTMAN:  Well, since you already laid the 
gauntlet on whether I can be moderate, let me disabuse 
everyone of that in a moment.  This is the 60th anniversary 
— it's the 20th anniversary of the Federalist Society, which is 
a great thing to celebrate.  It's also the 60th anniversary of 
Everson, which is not so great to celebrate.  In fact, I'm going 
to stake out a pretty hard ground here.  I believe that it's one 
of the most radical transformations in constitutional law ever 
to occur with one of the greatest negative consequences for 
the long-term possibility of continued success of this nation 
ever. 
It was done by judicial fiat.  It's not even holding in the 
case.  There is no thoughtful, reasoned analysis, but by pure 
ipse dixit.  In one sentence from the pen of Justice Black, “If 
the Establishment Clause means anything, it means at least 
this:  Neither a state nor the Federal Government can pass 
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one 
religion to another.”  Now in that short sentence, he did two 
very radical things.  He completely altered the notion of the 
Establishment Clause even as it existed against the federal 
government.  The non-preferential view of the Establishment 
Clause that had prevailed up until then now becomes no aid 
to any religion, no aid to all religions.  It completes the wall 
of separation of church and state metaphor.  And he just kind 
of tucks it in there, “aid all religions”, and it's not even an 
issue in the particular case.  But we'll leave that aside today. 
The other radical part of that statement that I want to 
focus on today is the throwing in of the word “state”.  
“Neither the state nor the federal government can pass any 
such laws”.  Never before had the Establishment Clause been 
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understood to apply to the states.  It of course does so by 
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The citations to 
support his authority are the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporation cases involving the freedom of speech or the 
Free Exercise Clause.  And he just says, look, we've already 
incorporated the First Amendment without any reasoning or 
any discussion whatsoever of the obvious differences 
between those clear liberty-protecting clauses and this 
different-in-kind clause of the Establishment Clause.  Not a 
word.  Not a word of discussion.  And for more than a half-
century, no one seriously challenged Justice Black's ipsi dixit 
here. 
Now to be sure, Justice Potter Stewart questioned it in his 
dissenting opinion in Schempp in 1963.  He wrote, “The 
Establishment Clause was primarily an attempt to ensure that 
Congress not only would be powerless to establish a national 
church but would also be unable to interfere with existing 
state establishments.”  And Justice Rehnquist made a similar 
point when he dissented in Wallace v. Jaffrey, as Judge Pryor 
pointed out, in 1985.  And then Justice Harlan, concurring in 
Waltz v. Tax Commission, City of New York, in 1970, 
questioned whether applying the clause in the same manner 
as it applies to the federal government when you're dealing 
with state issues made sense.  But that's about all that we 
have challenging Justice Black's views back in Everson. 
Well, 55 years after that opinion comes down, Justice 
Thomas gives us an invitation.  In Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, the Ohio school voucher case in 2002, he begins his 
opinion by saying, “As a matter of first principles, I question 
whether our normal Establishment Clause test should be 
applied to the states.”  And then in Elk Grove v. Newdow in 
2004, the infamous Pledge of Allegiance case, he has several 
comments furthering his discussion; “the difficult question of 
whether and how the Establishment Clause should constrain 
state action under the Fourteenth Amendment,” he talks 
about.  And then he goes on.  “I would take this opportunity 
to begin the process of rethinking the Establishment Clause,” 
which he would acknowledge is a Federalism provision, 
which for this reason resists incorporation.  And a year later 
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in Van Orton v. Perry, the Texas Ten Commandments cases, 
he says, “I have previously suggested that the Clause's text 
and history resist incorporation against the states.” 
Now note, this is not your typical invitation.  When in 
Newdow he suggests that he would take the opportunity to 
begin rethinking that, but then he proceeds to tell us that he 
would acknowledge it's a federalism provision that resists 
incorporation, he's being pretty clear what his thinking is on 
the subject. 
The rethinking that needs to occur to take place is not his 
so much as his colleagues'. 
 (Laughter.)  
DEAN EASTMAN:  And ours.  And ours.  Now, it seems 
to me that Justice Thomas's rethinking invitation is 
particularly appropriate to this Society, which is really 
devoted both to understanding the original understanding of 
the clauses and trying to recover them wherever possible, but 
also, first and foremost, reminding us of the importance of 
Federalism to our overall structure of government.  So I think 
there are a couple of questions we should consider in taking 
Justice Thomas's invitation to rethink Everson seriously. 
Just what was the original meaning of the Establishment 
Clause?  Now here, I'm not going to talk about the current 
fight, whether it's the non-preferential view, or the non-
coercion view, or the strict separation of Church and State 
view, or all those, the endorsement view, the psychological 
coercion view, or any of those things that are the fodder for 
current Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Establishment 
Clause.  I am instead talking about the Federalism issue, and 
does it really resist incorporation? 
And the second issue, it seems to me we should address 
is, so what if it does?  Apart from our devotion to originalism, 
is this just one of those cases where 60 years is too much 
water under the bridge?  What is to be gained by restoring the 
original meaning?  And what is to be lost if we don't?  So let 
me take those two questions in turn. 
The original understanding — when Madison first 
proposed the language that would ultimately become the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, here is the 
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language he suggested in the House of Representatives:  “Nor 
shall any national religion be established.”  The Committee 
Report modified it slightly:  “No religion should be 
established by law.”  And that slight change has been used by 
folks to try and claim that it wasn't just a national church that 
they were trying to prohibit, but any aid whatsoever to 
religion. 
But if you read the debates, and they're very sparse, that's 
not what the objections to that language were.  The objections 
were rather just the opposite.  Representative Sylvester, in 
response to the Committee Report, and derivatively by 
Madison's original proposal, feared that those clauses would 
have a tendency to abolish religion altogether.  
Representative Huntington agreed.  He says, “The words 
might be taken in such latitude as to be extremely hurtful to 
religion,” and he gave as an example, they might interfere 
with the ability of churches to sue to enforce contractual 
obligations that they had relied on to build a church or what 
have you.  Those are all things that are going on at the local 
government. 
So, Livermore comes back and he proposes to add the 
words “Congress shall make no law touching religion.”  And 
it's significant because that's the closest language during the 
debate to the final version that we actually get.  The language 
ultimately adopted comes out of a conference committee.  
And here, we have the limitation that it applies only to 
Congress, but also this odd language, “touching religion”, 
rather than not establishing religion or not establishing a 
national religion.  And given that Livermore's suggestion 
comes on the heels of Sylvester and Huntington's concern 
that the first proposals were not protective enough of religion 
in the states, I think we see coming out of that congressional 
debate the twofold purpose, no national church, but there 
were a lot of other ways in which the federal government 
might interfere with state support or reliance on religion as it 
goes about its daily efforts. 
The Necessary and Proper Clause was front and center in 
the fight over the ratification of the Constitution at how 
expansive that authority was, and one of the concerns was 
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that Congress might use the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
use means tied to some other delegated power to restrict or 
otherwise shut down religious efforts in the states.  So 
Livermore's proposal, “Congress shall make no laws touching 
religion,” seems to very neatly encapsulate both sides of that; 
no national church and no federal interference otherwise with 
the state supports of religion. 
In other words, this is the way we're going to leave this 
question to the states.  And some states like Virginia might go 
Jefferson's way of a fairly strict separation, and other states 
like Massachusetts might have a fully established church.  
But because it was the states where the police powers were 
going to reside, that power to regulate the health, safety, 
welfare, and morals of the people, that we were going to 
leave those questions to the more local government rather 
than having a one-size-fits-all rule come out of Washington, 
which they did think would be destructive of religion. 
This doesn't change much in the Senate.  We've got a 
couple of other proposals in the Senate, but then it goes 
through a conference committee which consisted of several 
members of the clergy, people who were members of 
Congress at the time that were on that conference committee.  
And then the language we get, “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion,” is very similar to the 
proposal that Livermore gave us. 
Now, those twin things I think perfectly answer 
Representative Sylvester's objection.  And it's now, I think, 
fair to say that some pretty prominent scholarship over the 
last quarter-century or 20 years has started to re-take up this 
charge.  Akhil Amar, who I don't think probably began out to 
lead to this conclusion, has written that the Clause made clear 
that Congress could not interfere with the existing state 
establishments.  And I think that's the right historical record. 
Justice Story said that the Constitution left religion to the 
states.  And so, you get this invitation from Justice Thomas.  
And here's what he said in Newdow, picking up on this 
theme.  “The Establishment Clause is best understood as a 
Federalism provision.  It protects state establishments, but it 
does not protect any individual rights.”  So the notion of 
2007 Federalism  181 
 
  
incorporation of individual rights through the liberty 
component of the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth 
Amendment makes a lot less sense when you're talking about 
the Establishment Clause than when you were talking about 
the Free Speech or the Free Exercise Clause.  Justice Potter 
Stewart described it as an irony of incorporation that a clause 
evidently designed to leave the states free to go their own 
way should now have become a restriction on their 
autonomy. 
Okay, so now my second question:  Why does it matter?  
Aren't we better off with the separation of church and state 
and all the religious pluralism that we have?  Well, there's an 
aspect beyond just getting the constitutional question right 
that we ought to be focused on.  If we were to design a 
system today, would we have a separation clause, or would 
we have one that allowed religion to flourish side by side and 
in collaboration with at least local governments? 
Let me give you a few things from the founding 
generation.  The Northwest Ordinance — “Religion, morality 
and knowledge being necessary to good government and the 
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education 
shall forever be encouraged.”  When you go through the 
founders' statements on this, and we'll do more of it in the 
Q&A, they are full of recognition that you cannot expect to 
have a self-governing people in a government that will 
sustain itself over the long-term in this experiment in self-
government that will succeed over the long term if you don't 
have a fundamental reliance on virtue. 
Now, virtue is not the same thing as religion, of course, 
but President Washington, in his farewell address to us, his 
kind of last charge to his fellow citizens, reminds us that we 
would be foolish — “Reason and experience both forbid us to 
think that we could accomplish this civic education and moral 
virtue without reliance on religion.”  When you're talking 
about the long-term ability or capacity to sustain a self-
governing set of institutions, it requires more than anything 
else a virtue in the citizenry.  And the founders all thought 
that you get that virtue in the citizenry with reliance on and 
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collaboration with religion.  If we're not going to fix this, we 
may find ourselves in deep trouble in the long run. 
Thank you.  
 (Applause.) 
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  I like to think Federalist 
Society for inviting me today.  I always enjoy meeting up 
with friends here, and I'd like to apologize for Amtrak.  
Apparently there were leaves on the track. 
 (Laughter.) 
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  You would've thought 
they'd gotten around that a few years ago.  But they had to put 
sand in the engine, which didn't sound right to me.  But 
whatever. 
I'm going to focus in the end on Justice Thomas's 
reintroduction or introduction of the notion of Federalism as a 
way of reading incorporation or disincorporation, whichever 
position he's taking, and sometimes it's hard to tell.  But I'd 
like to start with a background of the way in which religion 
and the state are grounded in the culture and then to move on 
to how to read what Justice Thomas is actually suggesting. 
You know, the values of the Framers were deeply 
theological in the sense that by the time they got to the 
Convention, they all agreed on the fallen nature of man, that 
you can trust no one, no human holding power.  And so it 
was absolutely necessary to the extent that they could, to 
divide power, to separate power, to distance powerful entities 
from each other, to pit them against each other, and to learn 
from the abuses of power in Europe.  That was the 
atmosphere at the Constitutional Convention, and religion 
was mentioned twice; once when it was proposed there be a 
chaplain to provide prayers — nobody would pay; that was 
the end of that — and secondly, when James Madison said 
that he wanted to make sure that we didn't replicate the 
problems in England of religion determining who would vote. 
Now, the Establishment Clause, whether it applies to the 
federal government, the states, or locally, wherever it applies, 
it is a brilliant innovation in the sense that this is the first time 
that a governing group has proposed that religion and the 
state be clearly distinguished from each other, that the one 
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would not be permitted to be in union with the other to 
control the country.  This is a response, obviously, to 
England, to the European establishments.  It's a brilliant 
move.  And in my view actually, it's the reason for the 
vibrancy of religion in the United States. 
Now, we have many democracies around the world, and 
many of them do not have separation of church and state or 
disestablishment principles.  But none of them have the same 
degree of vibrancy and intense religious fervor among such a 
wide diversity of religious groups.  That's what distinguishes 
the United States from every other democracy in the world.  
And I'll get back to that. 
But having said that, that diversity that creates its 
problems, as Philip has pointed out.  What was religion at the 
time of the framing, when they would've been thinking about 
the Establishment Clause and these issues?  It was 
characterized by division, distinction, and difference.  The 
Massachusetts Congregationalists were intent on either 
removing or exterminating the Quakers and the Baptists.  It 
was in fact the Baptists, not the Catholics, who were the first 
to think in terms of separation.  And why?  Because they 
were an abused minority.  They were told they couldn't 
believe what they wanted to believe.  They were told they had 
to pay taxes to support an established church.  They had 
extremely articulate clergy that went around the states and 
preached separation in those terms.  There never has been a 
Kumbaya period for Christianity in the United States.  There's 
no period in our history where you can find all of the 
Christian sects holding hands and agreeing on anything, in 
fact. 
More recently — in the middle actually, after the Baptist 
and the Quakers had their problems with Congregationalists 
and everybody else isn't getting along, we get to the problems 
with the Catholics and Protestants, which is a very 
complicated story that has a lot to do with how you define 
democracy and dual allegiance to church and state.  But I 
won't get into that today. 
And more recently, of course, we have the very last 
permissible group to discriminate against in the United 
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States, of course, is the Atheists.  They are the single most 
hated minority group at this point.  But they are still part of 
the culture of diversity and distinction and actually vibrancy. 
So what I would stress is that the distinctive quality of the 
United States is its ability to support an ever-increasing 
diversity.  If you've read Diana Eck's work, which is 
absolutely fascinating, about the number of sects in the 
United States, it's mind-boggling.  And it's not just on the 
coasts.  It's in the Midwest and the South as well. 
So why would you place this Establishment Clause 
disability on the federal government?  That's the question.  
And the answer is pretty clear.  There was a fear of the 
concentration of power in the national government, and a fear 
of concentration of power joined by a religious entity being 
able to use the national power to dominate the country.  And 
so, there had to be a way to make sure that no religious entity 
could do that.  That, I take it everybody agrees that the 
federal government may not establish a religion. 
So the question before us, is why not apply it to the 
states?  The Establishment Clause was a political 
compromise.  The principle of keeping the power spheres of 
government and religion distinct does not require reference to 
federal or state government.  The idea obviously makes 
sense, applied to the states as well as the federal government 
because it's been applied to the states for years.  It's not the 
principle that would keep it from being applied to the states.  
It's that political compromise. 
So if we're going to go with original intention, the 
original intention on the basis of the compromise is no 
incorporation of the Establishment Clause against the states 
because the states weren't supposed to be limited by the 
Establishment Clause, which would mean that Justice 
Thomas would have to be willing to roll back every case 
under the Establishment Clause.  He is not.  And let me 
explain what is wrong with the approach that he has 
suggested. 
In the end, having read this over many times, thinking I 
was getting it wrong each time, I'm just mystified because he 
starts out by saying disincorporation — the Establishment 
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Clause is not a rights-bearing clause.  It's the rights-bearing 
clauses that should put you into incorporation.  So he's not 
against incorporation as a general matter, only with respect to 
the Establishment Clause because it's not a rights clause. 
But then he points to cases that he agrees should stand, 
even if disincorporation occurs through the Establishment 
Clause.  And the cases that he points to are cases like Larkin 
v. Grendel's Den, where churches had the ability to determine 
whether or not a liquor license would be issued near them.  
Or Kiryas Joel, where we have a religious organization that 
uses its own neighborhood boundaries as the sole determinant 
to figure out what the school district boundaries are.  Or 
Rosenberger, where the question was whether or not the 
government can prefer one religion over other religions. 
Now he wants to say that these are rights-based cases 
because if you keep the government from coercing religion, 
you increase religious liberty, and so therefore, these cases 
might more properly be decided under the Free Exercise 
Clause.  But that is definitely a Supreme Court pretzel 
argument.  It doesn't make any sense.  Those cases are all 
about power.  Does the government have the power to give its 
power to a religious entity to determine liquor license 
control?  The Court says no.  Does the government have the 
power to draw a school district according to the way a 
religious group wants it drawn because they are a chosen 
insular group?  The answer is no.  These are power cases. 
Now he's right that if you have disestablishment, you are 
more likely to increase liberty.  That's exactly what James 
Madison believed.  Disestablishment is one of the means to 
religious liberty.  But it doesn't mean that you are only 
dealing with rights.  You're still in this arena of power, of a 
separation of power between church and state and not just 
talking about individual rights. 
So in the end, he says that his theory is an anti-coercion 
theory.  But it's very unclear why you need to disincorporate 
the Establishment Clause to have a full anti-coercion.  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist's view was that you shouldn't let the 
Establishment Clause govern any instance unless you could 
prove coercion, and only in cases of coercion, then the 
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Establishment Clause would kick in.  In the end, that is 
actually Justice Thomas's theory.  It's all about coercion and 
switching Establishment Clause power cases under the 
umbrella of the Free Exercise Clause. 
So in the end, it seems to me that we are getting a lot 
more than we need.  His theory of disincorporation does not 
take you down new paths.  It simply re-articulates what it is 
that Chief Justice Rehnquist was working on from the day he 
walked into the Court.  And whether I agree with that or not, 
that's in place, and I think that it is no service to the doctrine, 
which by these quarters is being criticized as being incredibly 
confusing and inconsistent — there's new service to that 
doctrine to now introduce the concept of disincorporation 
after all these years of incorporation. 
So in the end, I have to say I am not persuaded by Justice 
Thomas's theory.  He calls it Federalism.  There's no one 
who's a greater fan of federalism in this room that I am, but it 
isn't.  In the end, he has a theory of coercion.  
Disincorporation is irrelevant, and we are back to where we 
started. 
Thanks very much. 
 (Applause.) 
JUDGE PRYOR:  Before we turn it over to a little Q&A 
from the audience, I was going to ask each of the panelists if 
they would like to say a few remarks in response to what 
they've heard from each other, beginning with Professor 
Eastman. 
You can remain seated for these kind of short remarks.  
And then I'll recognize those who want to ask questions.  You 
can start lining up at the microphone. 
If you've been to one of the panels that I've moderated 
before, you know you're likely, if your real intention is to 
filibuster and not ask a question, I'll probably interrupt you.  
What we really care about is an opportunity for questions.  
But you've heard from both Professor [ ] and Professor 
Hamilton. 
Dean Eastman, what, if anything, would you like to say in 
response? 
Can we have the mics turned on at the table? 
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DEAN EASTMAN:  With respect to [ ], buy his book.  
He has a lot more of that in there, and it's good stuff. 
I've got two questions from Marci.  I agree, one of the 
things that distinction is America so much and goes back to 
Tocqueville talking about this, and we continue to talk about 
it, is the vibrance of our religious institutions.  My question is 
how much of that ongoing vibrance is equity capital built up 
prior to 1947, and how long will it last if 1947's decision in 
Everson is going to have the consequences I predict? 
And the second thing I want to take up is the issue that 
Justice Thomas's opinions on this are confused.  I don't think 
so.  I think what he's doing is laying down marker for us, this 
invitation to revisit the incorporation in the Establishment 
Clause.  That's part one.  And then part two says, well, look, 
if we're not going to go wholesale and unincorporated, you 
know, which he hasn't even gotten Justice Scalia to join with 
him on that effort yet, then he starts laying the groundwork 
for, what would an incorporated establishment look like if 
we're going to keep it incorporated, that is as respective of 
Federalism as it can be? 
In his repudiation of jot for jot incorporation, the notion 
that because the states have a different source of power and 
different kinds of duties than the federal government does, 
that if we're going to apply the Establishment Clause to the 
states, it ought to be applied in a different manner than it's 
applied against the federal government.  And so, yeah, that 
position contradicts the first half of the opinions, but it's not 
incoherent.  He's just saying, look, if I don't get five votes for 
part one, here's part two, and let's start looking at it in those 
terms.  I think that's perfectly coherent.  And there's much 
more than just an anti-coercion principle and it. 
Although, I do regret his citation of Kiryas Joel.  But it's 
just a brief citation.  He doesn't elaborate on it.  I think Kiryas 
Joel has to go the other direction if you take seriously his 
other arguments in the case.  
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  Well, with respect to the 
first question about the vibrancy of belief in the United 
States, the statistics show that it is obviously still one of the 
most highly religious countries in the world, but not just in 
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identification of identity as religious but also in practice.  Far 
more practice of religious activity occurs in the United States 
than any place in the world where there is religious liberty 
permitted.  And so, I don't see any decline in religious values 
as of, starting with the '40s to now and that we have banked. 
But your implicit question is really about whether or not 
this is a Christian country, right?  I mean isn't that the implicit 
question?  And it's quite clear that the notion of a Christian 
country is actually just an abstraction with no content.  
There's never been, as I said before, a Christian entity.  There 
have always been Baptists and Methodists and a wide variety 
who all disagree with each other on very important issues.  So 
I would reject the “Christian country” label. 
With respect to Justice Thomas, that's a very charitable 
reading that he's not contradicting himself.  I think it's not 
accurate.  But in the end, if you concede that he's wrong 
about Kiryas Joel, then you're walking down my path pretty 
much.  If that doesn't belong in his theory, then he's 
inconsistent.  And what's going on here is that he wants to do 
something radical, but in his gut he knows none of those 
cases will ever be reversed.  So he's got to figure out how to 
build those cases into his doctrine and they don't fit.  So I just 
think he's just got to admit some cases don't fit his theory.  
JUDGE PRYOR:  Okay, thank you. 
We'll take our first question —  
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  Wait.  I have something to 
say. 
JUDGE PRYOR:  Well, all right.  Professor Hamilton 
wants to respond. 
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  I just want to say one quick 
thing.  It's not just embedded in case law.  I defy anyone in 
this room to issue a press release in which they say that the 
states may now have a single religion.  That won't happen.  It 
won't even happen in Utah or Maryland.  It's just not going to 
happen.  And why?  Because it's embedded in the culture that 
no one religion controls government levers.  
DEAN EASTMAN:  I'll agree — I mean, then we'll go to 
the questions.  Years ago, I was debating a federal judge on 
this question them and she said, ell, that would just violate, 
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and let me quote, the First Amendment's, quote, separation of 
church and state.  And I said, you know, I know you said the 
word “quote”, but it's not in there.  And she said, well, it 
certainly is.  And I said, look, I've got a copy right here, and I 
read it to her.  And I said those words are not there, so why 
are you putting quotes around them?  And her answer was, 
you obviously have a defective copy. 
 (Laughter.) 
DEAN EASTMAN:  And so Marci's right.  It's deeply 
embedded.  I just question whether it's right. 
JUDGE PRYOR:  One last remark. 
 (Laughter.) 
JUDGE PRYOR:  Okay.  First question.  
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:  (Off mic.) 
Professor [ ], Article 6, Section 3 has a prohibition against 
the religious qualification test for officeholders.  But it also 
has a requirement for state, for federal and state officers to 
take an oath or affirmation, which implies a belief in divine 
power or a least some virtuous responsibility for veracity.  
You referred to Amendment 10 and the Republican form of 
government as the two bulwarks that the disestablishment 
types refer to. 
What does Section 3 of Article 6 tell us about the free 
exercise and the antiestablishment provisions for 
incorporation?  
JUDGE PRYOR: Professor Hamilton, do you want to 
respond — either one of you?  
DEAN EASTMAN:  Yes.  There was — during the 
ratification debates in South Carolina, one of the amendments 
proposed was to insert the word “other” in the no religious 
test clause, recognizing that the oath clause was itself a 
religious test and, you know, just to clean it up a little bit so 
that we would acknowledge that.  But it says oath or 
affirmation, and today that's often taken as a protection of 
atheists for example.  It wasn't.  The Affirmation Clause was 
designed to protect those who were even more scrupulous in 
their religious belief; Quakers, largely, who took seriously the 
admonition in the Bible not to swear an oath against heaven 
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in anything.  So that's what the Affirmation Clause is.  It's not 
the way we've interpreted it more recently. 
JUDGE PRYOR:  Next question.  
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:  I'm David Mayer from 
Kaplan University Law School in Columbus, Ohio, and I 
wanted to ask the panel about the bifurcation of the First 
Amendment Religion Clause into two separate clauses, the 
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause, which it 
seems to me is also an invention of 20th-century 
constitutional law. 
Thomas Jefferson used his famous wall metaphor to refer 
to both free exercise and non-establishment.  I think it's fair to 
say Madison thought of a unitary freedom of conscience right 
which had two aspects.  Also grammatically, there is one 
clause; it has two phrases.  So my question is, couldn't it be 
argued that the bifurcation of the First Amendment Religion 
Clause is as much or if not greater transformation of original 
understanding than the incorporation doctrine?  
JUDGE PRYOR:  I'd like Professor Hamilton, if you're 
interested, to respond to that first.  Go ahead.  
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  I think that's — well, there 
are two answers to that.  One is, it's hard to read the history 
that way, given the way that the clause was drafted and 
moved around.  So they were separate clauses.  And frankly, 
on your theory, it's all one clause, so it's speech, 
establishment, et cetera.  I don't think that's very persuasive.  
I'll leave it at that. 
Just the way that Madison drafted it, and it went through 
all these changes — sometimes it had an Establishment 
Clause in it; sometimes it had free exercise; sometimes it had 
a conscience clause in it — quite a variety, and dealt with that 
so there were individual entities. 
DEAN EASTMAN:  And oftentimes, it had both a free 
exercise and freedom of conscience clause, which was odd.  
PROFESSOR HAMILTON: Right.  
DEAN EASTMAN:  But I think there's another point to 
be made here.  And that is the two parts of the clause — I 
mean, you're right; grammatically, it's single.  But the two 
parts of it aim at different things.  And it allows you, if you 
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accept my Federalism understanding of the Establishment 
Clause, to, for example, recognize that Massachusetts had an 
establishment but also had one of the strongest free exercise 
or freedom of conscience clauses of the original states.  And 
they didn't see those things as incompatible. 
We have so interpreted the Establishment Clause of the 
last 50 years to almost force a confrontation between the two 
that didn't exist.  It was perfectly okay to have state support 
of religion generally or even a particular religion, as long as 
you didn't compel a belief in it.  And then some states did go 
further and compel a belief in it, and that's where you end up 
with a freedom of conscience and free exercise clauses 
coming to the forefront. 
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  But the Massachusetts 
freedom of conscience clause, what it meant was you had a 
right to believe anything you wanted, and if you disagreed 
with the dominant religion in the state, you should leave.  It 
did not mean coexistence.  
JUDGE PRYOR:  Yes, sir.  
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:  Mark Mittleman from St. 
Louis.  When we talk about incorporation, I've noticed that all 
the panelists have sort of left out the tortured history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment interpretation in which first the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause was read out, and then the 
Due Process Clause was used to bring back something called 
incorporation.  We know for one thing that Justice Thomas is 
also interested in recovering the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause and perhaps dealing with incorporation in that 
fashion. 
Could you all comment on that whole aspect of the 
incorporation?  
DEAN EASTMAN:  I often compare this problem, when 
I'm teaching my students, to the little childhood game where 
the critter pops up and you hammer it down, and it pops up 
after another hole.  This ideal of fundamental rights is such a 
part of our history and the whole understanding of governing 
structures that if you shoot it down on privileges and 
immunities where it was designed to be, it pops up under due 
process or substantive due process of the substantive 
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component of equal protection or the unenumerated 
penumbras in the Ninth Amendment or whatever.  And you 
know, the problem is not with the understanding we ought to 
have on enumerated rights or fundamental principles, or even 
incorporation of some things.  The problem is that the Court 
doesn't understand the basis on which those decisions ought 
to be made. 
JUDGE PRYOR:  Phil, do you want to say anything 
about that?  
JUDGE PRYOR:  Professor Hamilton.  
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  Well, and just one other 
quick note, and that is that one of the reasons you're not 
hearing a lot about the Fourteenth Amendment's intent is 
because if you read the Fourteenth Amendment's history in 
toto, you can find a contradiction for almost every page.  It is 
a convoluted, confusing set of statements.  And for law office 
history, it's great because you can pick out what you want.  
But for real history, it's not very helpful.  It's very hard to tell 
an intent for anybody in those rooms.  So we're kind of stuck 
with theory, as opposed to any kind of concrete original 
intent.  
JUDGE PRYOR:  John Bingham from Ohio? 
JUDGE PRYOR:  Next question.  
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:  Let me lay out a basic 
framework, kind of where I'm coming from on this, and you 
can analyze that, and then secondly, a question of false from 
that. 
Basically, I describe this, there was a basic pole between 
two positions at the time of the founding.  One is more 
representative of Jefferson, who views religious freedom as 
an individual right, and the other is the communitarian 
position, which had a long tradition of the Puritans in 
believing in, the general common belief at the time should 
prevail in a particular state.  And a Federalist approach to the 
interpretation of the First Amendment seems to be a 
compromise that really allowed for both the communitarian 
and individual's perspective of Jefferson to coexist in the 
states during that time period.  But over time, it seems as 
though Jefferson's position has won. 
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In light of that comment in light of that fact that he 
viewed it as an individual right, and he said in his bill for 
religious freedom that it's sinful and tyrannical to force a 
person to pay for the propagation of ideas which he does not 
believe in.  And that's the foundation of his perspective, 
which has come to prevail. 
What's the implications for, for example, education.  
When you extend the implications of — I mean you might 
separate church and state on the level of institutions, but 
really the propagation of ideas in education is really 
fundamental, and so wouldn't the implication of the First 
Amendment in education be that there should be a separation 
of church and state?  Is that the final, I mean, separation that's 
going to have to occur if we're going to implement the kind of 
methodology that's presently being proposed?  
DEAN EASTMAN:  I'd go the other direction.  I think if 
we were to take Jefferson seriously in its full implications, 
that I should have to pay for no idea that I disagree with, then 
we wouldn't have public schools at all because they can teach 
a whole lot of crap in there that I disagree with. 
 (Laughter.) 
 (Applause.) 
DEAN EASTMAN:  But that's why the Federalism 
solution is the right one in a pluralistic society.  And maybe 
the growth of our country makes it impossible to have 
establishment statewide, but it ought not to be impossible to 
have the little community of Kiryas Joel want to have a 
public school supported by their community, where they can 
say prayer in accord with their faith. 
What we've done is pretend that there's no public aspect 
of religion.  Justice Scalia talks about this in his defense in 
Lee v. Weisman.  If religion were just a matter of private 
concern to be treated as, you know, something that should be 
confined to the privacy of one's home, like pornography — 
wonderful turn of phrase — then there wouldn't be these 
conflicts.  But you know, most believers think that you ought 
to have a public affirmation, particularly at monumental 
moments of your life, like graduation, like swearing in 
somebody into office when they're going to take an oath, and 
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that this public community aspect of religion is critically 
important. 
And so what we've done is adopt a separation view that 
excludes that but adopts with almost religious fervor every 
counter-religion view.  And we insist that people go to public 
schools to learn it. 
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  Well, but that presumes 
there is “a religion”, and there is not “a religion” in any 
community in the country, as proved by the Wiccan woman 
in Virginia who wanted to read at the opening of the City 
Council.  They had a cycle, right, and so they had a Baptist 
and they had a Methodist, they had a Rabbi.  I think they 
even had an Imam.  But they said the Wiccan couldn't do it.  
Now that's what America is right now.  The Wiccan is there, 
and she believes vibrantly.  The notion that there is "a 
religion" to do what John just described is just false. 
If there was a religion to do that, that might be one thing, 
but there is no single religion — except if communities can 
use political power to define their boundaries to exclude all 
others, which is what Kiryas Joel was about.  It wasn't about 
including themselves.  It was about excluding the others.  
That's a different issue. 
JUDGE PRYOR:  Do you want to say anything more, 
gentlemen? 
DEAN EASTMAN:  No, no, no.  Mariah.  It wasn't Sally.  
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  Well, the Wiccans will tell 
you they are a religion.  They will tell you. 
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  No, no.  They well.  
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  Yeah, you should. 
JUDGE PRYOR:  Before we get to the next question, it 
will remind everyone, if you have a cell phone that has a ring 
tone like “When the Saints Go Marching In” or “Hold that 
Tiger”, please quiet it. 
Next question.  
AUDIENC PARTICIPANT:  Charlie Stanbaugh from 
Jacksonville, Florida.  The state and local governments, I 
think, have abdicated the  constitutionally given 
responsibility for the protection of the morality over the 
morals of their citizens.  And it seems to me that you either 
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accept that as a good thing or you look for a way to challenge 
the current situation, which is the incorporation of the states 
and that Fourteenth Amendment.  So which do we prefer? 
DEAN EASTMAN:  Yeah, I'm not so sure the states have 
abdicated that responsibility.  I think that it's been taken from 
them, at least a good number of the states.  I'm thinking, for 
example, most recently the Texas v. Lawrence case involving 
the Texas anti-sodomy statute, which they considered to be 
part of their ongoing efforts to the Police Power Clause.  The 
Supreme Court said you're not allowed to do that anymore.  
In fact, you cannot do anything to further morality.  So, this 
aspect has been taken from them.  You know, we can then 
debate whether that's a good thing or a bad thing.  It's 
certainly a good thing if we define liberty in a very expensive 
way.  But I don't think that's the way the Founders envisioned 
it. 
You know, there was a reason that the police power was 
defined in the way it does.  You go back and you trace the 
history of the definition of the police power in Supreme Court 
precedent.  It used to be health, safety, welfare, and morals of 
the people.  We now just kind of truncate it; health, safety, 
and welfare.  And so we've lost something there, and I think it 
coincides with the loss in Everson.  
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  This is another one of those 
broad sweeps that can't accurately be supported.  The notion 
of local government has given up on morality is just hard to 
hear. 
In my community, which is Washington Crossing, where 
Washington crossed the Delaware, Pennsylvania, there is a 
rule which we just learned about.  I didn't know about it.  My 
son did; he's a teenager, which I was glad he know about it 
before I did.  There was a party down the street from us this 
weekend after a school dance and the cops came because they 
were very loud.  Fifty kids were arrested.  Now it's not 
because 50 kids were drinking.  It's because 10 kids were 
drinking.  But the moral rule in Washington Crossing is that 
if you stay at a party where there's drinking, you're just as 
guilty as the kids who were drinking. 
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That's morality, and you can find that threaded all through 
the law.  And so you may have objections to certain types of 
morality, but that — I just don't think you can say that we've 
lost morality in toto in the local communities.  I just don't see 
it. 
DEAN EASTMAN:  Maybe it's just because I live in 
California. 
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  They could be. 
 (Laughter.) 
JUDGE PRYOR:  Move to Alabama where, when I was 
attorney general, I had to defend a sex toy law. 
 (Laughter.) 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:  Mark Scarberry, 
Pepperdine Law School, also in California, there in Malibu.  
If we're thinking about whether the Establishment Clause can 
be incorporated, and in doing that thinking about what's its 
content, and does that make it subject to something that could 
be incorporated, I noted that John focused on the original 
public meaning as of the time of adoption of the First 
Amendment.  Wouldn't it make more sense to ask what it was 
thought to mean at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment?  I'm wondering if you could comment on that, 
if perhaps you think the meaning at that point went so 
muddled, as the other two panelists have suggested, that that's 
not helpful. 
And then for Philip, if nativism was pushing the Court 
toward separation of church and state and incorporating that, 
was there a push to then incorporate it to bring back the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, incorporate not just the 
Establishment Clause that way, but other constitutional rights 
as well which would then limit those rights to citizens and the 
immigrants who weren't citizens who wouldn't get the 
protection of those rights against nativist state governments? 
DEAN EASTMAN:  Yes, let me — it's a very good 
question.  The reason I focus on the founding period is not so 
much to say that necessarily is going to govern the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  And you're right; the understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment would govern.  But I was focusing on 
it because if I'm right about their view of the non-interference 
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aspect of the Establishment Clause and its two components, a 
no national church, because that would essentially shut down 
all the other churches, and no other interference, because 
there are lots of other ways we might interfere, then the 
notion of incorporation is particularly weak when you're 
talking about the Establishment Clause because it basically 
allows, in fact requires, the federal government through the 
courts to do precisely the thing that was forbidden to them by 
the First Amendment. 
And so, if that's the understanding in 1791, you'd want a 
much clearer articulation that they want to turn that 
understanding on its head than anything we get out of the 
Fourteenth Amendment debates.  
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:  Of course, by 1868 there 
weren't state establishments.  
DEAN EASTMAN:  No, there weren't any of the hard 
state establishments, but there was extensive support of 
religion. 
The whole school system — I mean we talk about public 
versus private.  That didn't exist.  You know, the first thing 
put up with a town meeting hall, which was the church, and 
on Saturday nights it was the dance hall.  On Sunday, it was 
the church.  And during the week, it was the school.  And on 
Wednesday night, it was the town council meeting.  You 
know, talk about separation of church and state.  It didn't 
exist.  This is the same building and the same people and the 
same players. 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:  And the nativism wasn't 
so overt in the Supreme Court that —  
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:  — the Court would then 
seize on privileges and immunities in that more subtle way. 
JUDGE PRYOR:  Okay.  Next question.  
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:  Thanks.  Professor 
Hamilton, I wonder, to the extent — and I would tend to 
agree with you — that we largely have inculturated a 
resistance to outright state establishments, but having so 
stated, is it necessary to then defend the incorporation if the 
fear is not the rise of fully established state religions but 
rather that question of whether or not prayer at school is all 
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right if they don't let the Wiccans — in other words, if we let 
the market decide when a religion is risen to a level within a 
community that it would be practiced, much as, you know, 
third parties have to fight to get on the political ballot? 
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  Well, I mean, I'll take all 
day to criticize the two-party system.  I do get a big mistake. 
But you know, I just think that for this audience, it's not 
persuasive, I'm fully aware.  But the reality — 
SPEAKER:  Well, you might persuade me.  
PROFESSOR HAMILTON: — yeah, well, the reality 
that is unavoidable is that if you sit on a subway in New 
York, there's going to be many religions in the same car with 
you.  We live in a culture of unbelievable diversity, and we 
live in America, where if you don't like what your mother 
church says, you just create your own church.  You break off.  
You take your parish and you go packing. 
We proliferate religions in the United States, and it is 
extremely subversive in the same concerns that Philip has 
with respect to the Catholics at a certain time in history.  I 
think it's very subversive to attempt to identify or honor 
either a majority or a gathering of religions without reference 
to the vast diversity.  Diversity has always been the mark of 
American religion, and it still is.  And I understand, I think, 
why we have such a push for a Christian country right now.  
But I think it's reactionary rather than looking forward into 
where America really is going.  
DEAN EASTMAN:  But here's the problem.  That 
diversity, courtesy of the Supreme Court, has brought us to 
the point where the overwhelming number of believing 
citizens can't say as innocuous a prayer as “God of the free 
and home of the brave, watch over these graduates.” 
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  Wait.  Let's do the numbers.  
The majority of Christians don't want to do that.  The 
problem with the debate in America right now is that 
conservative Christians are religious and everybody else is 
secular.  But if you have an 86-percent believer rate in a 
country, they are not secular.  It's religious people debating 
religious people.  Some religious people want prayers in the 
schools.  Many religious people don't want prayers in the 
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schools.  And all I ask for is accurate factual bases to have 
these debates.  So that's the accuracy of it.  
DEAN EASTMAN:  No, it's not.  So what we ought to do 
is throw it up to a vote like they did in Santa Fe School 
District down in Texas.  Let's have two votes.  First, should 
we have a student comment before the football game, and 
second, if we should — so, two votes — then pick somebody 
to give it.  And it passed overwhelmingly that, yes, we ought 
to have a student comment, and then we ought to pick this 
student so she can actually give an invocation — an 
overwhelming majority.  And you know, I find that — not in 
New York, I'll concede, and not in San Francisco and 
probably not in LA.  But in a lot of places in this country, you 
would win 80 or 90 percent of those numbers. 
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  And both of the people who 
brought that claim and the people who brought the claim 
against Judge Roy Moore in Alabama for his two-ton granite 
10 Commandments have had to be under National Guard 
protection.  Think about that.  So what you're talking about is 
rank majoritarianism and empowering that kind of will to 
power that is exactly what Nietzsche described that is 
extremely subversive to what is best about America.  
DEAN EASTMAN: But Marci, what you're talking about 
is single heckler's veto to shut down the thing that the 
overwhelming majority of people in certain locales want.  
That's not pluralism.  That's mandate from the Supreme Court 
that would tell to, you know, large majorities you can't do 
what you want.  If you think prayer has some public aspect, 
you're not allowed to do that.  We're going to restrict your 
free exercise in ways never envisioned by the Founders, and 
we're going to do it from Washington, DC, by nine people on 
the court.  That's neither Federalism nor a proper 
understanding of originalism of either Free Exercise or the 
Establishment Clause. 
 (Applause.) 
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  Yes, that's a good stump 
speech, but it's not accurate.  
JUDGE PRYOR:  Well, as a matter of some historical 
accuracy, I had some role in the removal of that two-ton 
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monument from the rotunda of the Alabama Judicial 
Building.  But I don't recall, Professor Hamilton, Steve 
Glassroth, who was the plaintiff in the case and is a lawyer in 
Montgomery, ever having been under National Guard 
protection. 
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  Well, that's according to his 
lawyers. 
JUDGE PRYOR:  It's news to me.  But I had 24-hour 
security. 
 (Laughter.)  
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  My point is proved. 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:  I was wondering if you 
disincorporate the Establishment Clause, what do you think 
that would mean in practical terms for the states, like what 
types of laws do you think states should be able to pass 
respecting religion, or would they pass?  And what types of 
laws would they still not be able to pass?  
JUDGE PRYOR:  I think that's a good question.  That 
must be a law student.  
DEAN EASTMAN:  It's a very good question, and it goes 
back to what I think Justice Thomas was trying to do in the 
second half of his opinion, and that is try and tease out the 
difference between where there's a coercive establishment 
that actually would violate free exercise or freedom of 
conscience principles and what is not.  And he wants to 
repudiate the entire line of cases and thinking from Justice 
O'Connor on the endorsement principle, that it doesn't violate 
your freedom of conscience to have to walk by Ten 
Commandments or to have to listen in respectful silence to a 
prayer that the majority in the community wants to have at a 
monumental event in their children's lives. 
So, you know, a lot of those things that we take as 
violations of the Establishment Clause now would be 
perfectly permissible, even saying I'm Kiryal Joel, look, this 
is going to be for the Hassidic Jewish community because our 
practices make it so difficult to engage otherwise.  There's 
nothing wrong with that.  Now, if you force somebody who 
doesn't believe in that to have to live in that district and go to 
that school and adhere to that belief, now you've crossed the 
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line.  But it's a Free Exercise line; it's not an Establishment 
Clause line.  At least, that's what Justice Thomas was trying 
to tease out in the second half of the Newdow opinion 
primarily. 
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  And of course, the problem 
with Philip's statement is that he's now reduced the vast 
diversity of religious belief in the United States to two sides.  
There's not two sides.  There's thousands.  And that's the 
problem.  That's what's difficult by the United States, and I 
don't think that rolling back where we've come is going to 
help us into the future.  This is a future we don't understand.  
It's very difficult to figure out how to bring it into the culture 
and treat as Americans so many people who don't believe 
anything remotely like what you believe.  That's hard.  
JUDGE PRYOR:  Our next question.  This will be the 
last.  I think we're done.  Yes, this will be.  Well, we'll allow 
one other answer this question.  
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:  Hi.  My question is 
principally for Professor Hamilton, but don't worry.  It's just 
really more asking for information. 
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  Trust me.  I'm not worried 
up here.  You have no idea.  
DEAN EASTMAN:  We're on the same side most of the 
time. 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:  I hate it when people 
come here, and they feel like they're personally being fired 
upon constantly.  And I do have to say that, you know, I've 
been very involved in politics for a while and used to be 
involved professionally.  And you may know that in 2004, 
two different Republican Party headquarters, local ones, were 
fired into.  And when I showed up at my place that I was 
working at — I was establishing a new one — I had a note on 
the door that said “get out”.  So I don't know what having to 
be under guard after you've filed a lawsuit says about our life, 
but I think that at least the experience as I've had it is that 
we're — I don't know if it's at a moment that any different, 
but we're certainly an interesting moment.  
JUDGE PRYOR: Is there a question? 
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AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:  There is a question.  
Sorry. 
Professor Hamilton, at the very beginning of your, of 
your speech, you said that the separationists, separationism 
was really the force behind the Establishment Clause as it 
was created at the Constitutional Convention.  And I wonder 
if you could perhaps suggest some reading on that or some 
history in regards to that because it sounded as though you're 
arguing that kind of the Baptist spirit of separation had really 
won the day there when there weren't many states that, as had 
been pointed out previously, had established churches then. 
 They were the entrenched, powerful ones that were — 
the people from society were all members of those churches.  
Most of the people who went to the conventions were not 
religious — I don't know if you want to say dissenters — 
were not members of minority religions in the United States 
at the time.  And not establishing a church nationally at that 
time, I think it's not radical to say at the time, that was a much 
weaker level, leaving the power the states and letting states 
continue to have their established churches or to establish 
new churches.  It's kind of a weak compromise, isn't it?  You 
lose most of your position if the feeling was separation —  
JUDGE PRYOR: The question? 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:  — wouldn't it more be 
that there would have been a provision in the states affecting 
the states to begin with?  Isn't it more — it just seemed to me 
that since the power was with the established churches, did 
they kind of win by allowing them to keep their state 
establishments?  
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  Well, yeah, they won the 
political compromise, that's true, as did the plantation owners 
with respect to slavery.  There are all sorts of very ugly 
compromises that were necessary to get the Constitution 
through.  And the person I view as the single most brilliant 
person at the convention is James Wilson.  With respect to 
slavery, he said the Constitution will never survive it.  So 
yeah, it was a political compromise. 
Did the established churches win?  Yes, but what's 
interesting is that they almost immediately began to 
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disassemble, and the states start to amend their constitutions 
very quickly to add their own disestablishment clauses, I 
mean not the next day but over the next decades.  And so if 
establishment or having a dominant church is part of the 
American fabric, it's interesting that it was gone by 1833.  
And you have ask the question, historically what does that 
say about establishment?  And what that tells you is that the 
establishment that's being, you know, trumpeted up here is a 
very weak sister of the establishments that were in place.  But 
it is still related in the sense that the government can be co-
opted by a particular religious viewpoint.  
JUDGE PRYOR:  Our last question. 
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:  In regards to the diversity 
of religion, which Professor Hamilton accurately mentions, to 
me I'm just — I'm throwing this out — does that not point to 
a greater need to unincorporate the Fourteenth Amendment 
against the states so that the states, those states that do have 
more of a predominant religious view, not necessarily of a 
religious sect but a philosophy, and also that philosophy 
could frame their moral debate, for instance, in a different 
way than the Miller test does on pornography?  I mean, the 
Miller test gives a token local standard.  But to me, does that 
— shouldn't the states actually have more power to frame the 
religious issue in terms of their morality because of the fact 
of diversity because not every area in the country has an 
extreme amount of diversity of religion or religious 
philosophy. 
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  No.  That's exactly the 
opposite of what ought to happen.  What you're suggesting is 
that a state with a majority of a particular religion or a 
politically powerful religion, which is a different thing, 
provide the intellectual moral framework for the state.  That 
seems to me relatively indefensible on the part of every other 
person in the state.  There is no state that has all of one set of 
believers.  
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT:  No.  I'm not talking about 
a church I'm talking about a religious philosophy, that if 
people in a state have a certain religious or moral philosophy, 
they should have more power and not be dictated to by 
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Supreme Court decisions as to what their, how their morality 
is going to be framed in terms of their religious debate 
because —  
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  You're arguing for 
ecumenicalism.  
DEAN EASTMAN:  I think you're right.  And pluralism 
in religion actually supports that.  And the Federalism 
solution offers that.  Now, you might say the states have 
grown so big that the Federalism solution doesn't even work 
at the statewide level, and the cottage industry of scholarship 
that has been produced after Justice Thomas's invitation in 
Zelman to start re-exploring this question. 
One of the more interesting student articles has suggested 
that if we are going to incorporate Establishment Clause and 
it is one that fosters pluralism at a local community level, that 
we ought to apply to the states in the same way we apply to 
the federal government but not to the local governments, 
which are in size comparable to the old states, a very 
interesting idea that would allow the pluralistic community 
— but the only way you could go in the other direction is if 
you assume every religious exercise has to be private because 
once you assume that part of the religious exercise has to be 
public, public affirmation at the community level, then what 
you're really doing is shutting down free exercise in order to 
implement that version of anti-establishment proposition.  
And I think there's just no support for it, and I think it's 
debilitating to foster any kind of moral virtue we need to 
survive.  
PROFESSOR HAMILTON:  It doesn't have to be private.  
The question is whether the government is going to co-opt 
and stand behind it.  That's the issue of disestablishment.  
Religion fills our public square.  It is full of religion.  The 
question is whether or not any particular religion or group of 
religions coming to agreement — which I'd like to be at that 
meeting — are going to be able to get the government to 
stand behind them to give them more heft for their beliefs to 
dominate the community.  That's what disestablishment is 
about. 
JUDGE PRYOR:  Thank you.  That completes the panel. 
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(Panel concluded)  
